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ABSTRACT
“Tea

and Sympathy”:

The United States and the Sudan Civil War, 1985-2005
Peter W. Klein
The specters of violence and economic insecurity have haunted
the Sudan since its independence in 1956.

The United States

Congress has held numerous hearings on the Sudan's civil war and
U.S. television news outlets have reported on the conflict since
1983.

While attempting to engage the Sudan in a viable peace

process, the U.S. Congress has been beset by ineffectual Cold
War paradigms and an inability to understand the complexities of
the Sudan civil war.

U.S. television news programs, on the

other hand, engaged in a process of oversimplification, using
false dichotomies to reduce the conflict into easily digestible
pieces.

This thesis will analyze the overall tone and focus of

U.S. Congressional hearings and television news broadcasts on
the Sudan and demonstrate the problematic factors in their
portrayals of the war.
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PREFACE
Independence and civil war came to the Sudan at nearly the
same time.

The Sudan gained independence from British colonial

rule in 1956, and only a year later the new nation took a
precipitous turn toward civil war.

Although the Sudan

essentially experienced one long civil war from 1956 until a
2005 peace accord, a brief attempt at peace from 1972-1983
effectively broke the war into two periods, 1956-1972 and 19852005. Understanding this long, protracted civil war has proven
difficult for the international community, especially those
countries attempting to broker peace.

The United States has

been at the forefront of those attempts at ending the conflict
and has fallen victim to the same obstacles to comprehending the
war. In order to identify and examine United States’ attitudes
and misunderstandings of the second Sudanese Civil War, this
thesis analyzes U.S. television news outlets and U.S.
Congressional hearing transcripts from the time period 19852005.
Rife with complex ethnic rivalries and intricate political
nuance, the Sudan Civil War often seems to escape explanation
and understanding.

In addition, the brief period of peace that

divided the civil war into two parts allowed outside observers
to examine the second civil war independently of the first.
Members of the United States Congress and television news
4

reporters embraced simplistic dichotomies, such as Arab vs.
African and Muslim vs. Christian, instead of looking to the
historical roots of the conflict.

The inability to grasp the

complete complexities of this civil war has served to limit the
ability of the United States to contribute effectively to any
real change.

Exasperated with Congressional committee members’

refusal to understand the complexities and adopt a historical
appreciation for the war, historian Robert O. Collins testified
that the United States had little more to offer the people of
the Sudan than “tea and sympathy.”1
Dominated by the paradigm of Cold War politics in the
1980s, one can see a shift in the U.S. Congress as it shed its
Cold War mindset throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first
century. Throughout the 1980s members of Congress investigated
the Sudan’s nascent second civil war, 1985-2005, and the
resulting humanitarian disaster in terms of self-serving
politics. The Sudan became a place of great geo-strategic
importance and U.S. politicians considered it to have the
capacity to become a significant trading partner. In the 1990s
and later, as the Cold War ended, the focus of Congressional
inquiries moved from the United States’ self-preservation to a

1

Robert O. Collins, testifying in United States Congress, Senate, The
Crisis in Sudan, May 4, 1993, 30. Mr. Collins answered “all I believe you
can offer, senator, is tea and sympathy,” to the question of what the United
States can do to solve the political crisis in the Sudan.
5

more humanitarian inclined foreign policy. Congressmen and
Senators waxed philosophic about the nature of human suffering
in Africa's largest country and pondered on what exactly they
could do to end this blight on the world's conscience.

Amid

their self-congratulating and pompous speeches and their naïve,
arrogant, and often redundant questions, Congressional hearings
often amounted to little in the way of substantive discussion.
They focused much of their time on the issue of humanitarianism,
using the suffering of the Sudanese as a cop-out to discussing
the true political nature of Sudanese problems.
Often hearings became mired in the conventional wisdom
surrounding the Sudanese Civil War: that it was North vs. South,
Arab vs. African, Muslim vs. Christian. Although all three are
indeed aspects of the civil war, standing alone none of them
come close to describing the true nature of Sudanese aggression.
The primary reason that the Sudan's civil war has been reduced
to such simplistic explanations hinges on the fact that the
hearings on the Second Civil War do not take into account the
complexities and nuances of the First Civil War. In order to
understand the Sudanese civil wars, one must take into account
colonial and pre-colonial dynamics that dominated Sudanese life.
In addition, the myriad ethnicities that comprise the Sudan
existed with their very own political structures long before the
Sudan became a country. Certainly, issues of religion, race, and
6

geographic location play a role, but they do not define the
Sudanese struggle. This thesis analyzes U.S. Congressional
hearings and American TV news broadcasts- the latter assembled
by the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive- in an
effort to demonstrate where each of these institutions failed to
fully comprehend the complete nature of the Sudanese Civil War.
The first chapter discusses the primary sources the author
has chosen as the basis of his research and the reasoning behind
his choices. Much of this chapter focuses on the TV News Archive
at Vanderbilt University and the transcripts of Congressional
hearings from the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.
The second chapter explains the historical background
surrounding the Sudan as a whole. Although the chapter primarily
focuses on the Sudan's post-independence machinations, it does
begin with a treatment on the Sudan’s role as a colony, first
within the Turkish Empire and then as a part of the British
colonial sphere. This chapter primarily serves as an
introduction to the civil war which began shortly after
independence.
Three distinct case studies comprise chapters three, four,
and five.

Chapter three discusses the simplistic dichotomies,

African vs. Arab and Christian vs. Muslim, used by Congress and
news outlets to describe the Sudan’s complex civil war.
Congress’s and reporters’ reliance on these dichotomies led them
7

either to disregard or overlook the ethnic rivalries reviving in
the South at this time.

Chapter four examines this intra-South

civil war, primarily between the two largest ethnicities, Nuer
and Dinka, and also the intra-Nuer fighting. Chapter five
analyzes the effect of Cold War politics on the policy positions
of, and testimony of witnesses to, the members of Congress.

The

sixth and concluding chapter discusses the role of
humanitarianism in Congress’ deliberative process and television
news’ coverage, and the genocide in Darfur.

8

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Sudan has been mired in civil war since its inception
as a newly formed country in 1956.

Born of Britain's hasty

decision to divest itself from its colonial aspirations
following World War II, the Sudan did not enter nationhood with
a cohesive political structure in place.

Competition for

political power and resources, especially between North and
South, dominated political life. That struggle has lasted for
the past fifty years.

Incessant civil war, with few respites of

peace, has decimated the country, physically and mentally,
leaving scars that may never heal.

For their part, foreign

governments and media outlets have continually attempted to
digest and understand the civil war as they see it.

However,

oversimplification and lack of in-depth knowledge often beset
their good intentioned reporting and deliberations on the second
civil war.

Much of the relevant historical aspects and causes

of the second civil war lie in the preceding war and the
colonization period.
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa and comprises a
total area of almost two and a half million square kilometers.
The name Sudan comes from the Arabic term for the swath of land
that crosses the entire continent at relatively the same

9

longitudinal degrees as the Sudan, called the Bilad es Sudan,2 or
“The land of the Blacks.”3 The Sudan gained its independence on 1
January, 1956 after years of colonization, first under Turkish
and then, finally, combined British-Egyptian rule.

During

British colonization, the Northern half of the country,
primarily Arab in make-up, and the Southern half, primarily
black-African, progressed separately from each other with
neither side coming into much contact with the other.

More

politically astute than their Southern counterparts and having
the nation's capital, Khartoum, in the North, the Northern Arabs
enjoyed greater political power during and after colonization.
Following independence the Sudan quickly fell into civil
war as Southern fears of Northern hegemony metastasized after
Khartoum ordered Southern soldiers to transfer north.

Those

soldiers mutinied and formed a guerilla army in the Sudanese
periphery, sparking the first civil war that lasted until 1972.
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 formally ended the first
civil war and ushered in a scant eleven year period of uneasy
truce and cease-fire.

The peace quickly ended in 1983 as

Southern aspirations of political autonomy never materialized
and Khartoum adopted Shari'a (Islamic law) as the basis for
Sudanese law, angering many non-Muslims throughout the country.
2

One may also see the Arabic name for this area as the Bilad el Sudan
or the Bilad al Sudan.
3
Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998)25.
10

Members of Congress, witnesses, and TV news media, new to
the Sudanese conflict, picked up on the issues of religion, the
dichotomy of Christian vs. Muslim, and metamorphosed these into
one issue, seeing it as the single greatest reason for war
within the Sudan.

Reporters and members of Congress alike

shunned a historical approach to viewing the Sudanese civil wars
and instead boiled the conflict down into two easily
recognizable actors, Christians and Muslims.

Admittedly, a

black and white perception of the war is much easier to digest,
but it makes for a poor understanding.
Religion did not have an impact on the first civil war.

By

focusing on the religious aspect of the second civil war,
observers failed to appreciate the historical causes of the
first civil war and then viewed the second conflict
independently of the first; or worse yet, they retroactively
imparted a religious tinge to the first civil war that does not
belong there, often by conflating Arab with Muslim and BlackAfrican with Christian and then describing the Arab/African
schism as Muslim vs. Christian.
With these sentiments in mind, this thesis analyzes the
response and coverage of the second Sudanese civil war by the
United States Congress and the major television news
broadcasters in the United States.

The television news

broadcasts considered in this thesis cover the entire period of
11

the second civil war, 1983-present, and come from the nationally
televised broadcasting corporations: National Broadcasting
Company (NBC), American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), Fox News, and Cable News Network
(CNN).
The research for this thesis centers around the available
television news broadcasts between the years 1983 and the
present and was carried out at the Vanderbilt University
Television News Archive in Nashville, Tennessee.

To simplify

the searching process, the keyword search was limited to
“Sudan,” viewing every news segment that contained any coverage
of the Sudan between 1983 and the present, a total of fifty news
segments.

The news broadcast sample begins in 1983 to get a

sense of news coverage on the Sudan as the country again slid
toward civil war.
The base research involved creating a detailed outline of
each report, including quotations from the reporter.
Congressional hearings were treated in much the same way.

The

research focused on twelve hearings from the 1980s, 1990s, and
early 2000s that were selected for their pertinence to this
thesis.

The United States House of Representatives held eight

of the hearings, while the Senate held the other four.

Instead

of looking for specific instances of coded material, each
hearing’s transcript was read and detailed outlines of the
12

proceedings were created.
While systematically analyzing the primary documents,
common factors in both sets of material became obvious: a
chronic lack of understanding and the inability to observe
nuance.

These deficiencies led to an incomplete picture as

presented by television news broadcasts and hindered Congress’
ability to formulate a viable peace plan.

After assembling all

of the data, the hearings were analyzed for references to the
three specific issues that comprise the analytical framework for
the third, fourth, and fifth chapters: Arab/African dichotomy,
ethnic violence, and cold war politics.
For the reliance on the Arab/African and Muslim/Christian
dichotomies, transcripts were analyzed for instances where
either reporters or participants in the Congressional hearings
described the Sudanese civil war as a clash between Arabs in the
North and Africans in the South.

Occasionally, observers used

religious affiliations in place of ethnicity, transposing Arab
for Muslim and African for Christian.
Both the Congressional hearings’ and the TV news
broadcasts’ lack of discussion on the ethnic violence in
Southern Sudan proved much more straight-forward: News outlets
simply did not cover it; Congress did not investigate the
matter.

Familiar with the intra-South fighting that plagued the

second civil war, the author noticed a conspicuous dearth of
13

inquiries in Congress, and a complete lack of coverage in TV
news programs.

Much of the discussion on intra-South fighting

came from historians, experts in Sudanese history, who
ultimately had little impact on the members of Congress who took
their testimony.
Congressional hearings during the Cold War presented the
most interesting case study.

During the Cold War Congressional

hearings discussed Sudanese politics vis-à-vis United States
policy.

The United States acted friendly toward the Sudan only

as long as America deemed it necessary.

Post Cold War hearings

witnessed a relative reduction in friendly attitudes toward the
Sudan and an increase in the amount of criticism for Khartoum.
The interplay between television news broadcasts and
Congressional hearings presents another interesting topic,
perhaps for an additional study.

While it would be safe to

assume that Congressional officials watched television news, the
exact relationship between the two remains unclear.

Instances

did arise where Congressional hearing attendees either commended
the TV news media for its coverage or criticized media outlets
for not paying enough attention.

These examples were few and

far between and had no obvious impact on the Congressional
proceedings.
By far, most of the reports focused on the humanitarian
disaster that resulted from the intense fighting and the relief
14

effort, often hampered by both sides' unwillingness to agree to
a cease-fire and establish safe-havens for relief workers.

More

salient to this study, however, was the news portrayal of the
war.

Journalists invariably depicted the war as a struggle

between an Islamic government and Christian rebels, seemingly
averse to looking any deeper into the complicated history of the
Sudan.

15

CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since their independence in 1956 the Sudanese people have
seen three failed attempts at democracy and two bloody,
protracted civil wars.

Through mistaken, yet well intentioned,

British policies, the Northern and Southern halves of the Sudan
became entrenched in a political and ideological war.

Prior to

British involvement, the Sudan had already been separated by the
great religious divide that runs from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Indian.

The divide separated Africans of Arab descent and

culture from the predominantly Black Africans of the Sub-Saharan
(those lands south of the Saharan desert).

This divide ran

straight through the Sudan, pitting the Islamic North against a
Christian-Animist South.4
Southern Sudan had long been fertile ground for slave
raiding Arabs from the north.

Even with frequent ventures

south, the area beyond the Sahara largely remained a mystery to
the North.

Northerners viewed the Southerners with disgust and

contempt, while Southerners felt little but fear and trepidation
toward their northern neighbors.

With good reason, Southerners

feared a Northern army bent on creating an Islamic state.
During Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1880), the Sudanese effectively
4

John Voll, “Effects of Islamic Structures on Modern Islamic Expansion
in the Eastern Sudan,” The International Journal of African Historical
Studies 7 (1974): 85.
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put aside their fears and differences and backed the Mahdi
Revolt (1881-1898)5.

The revolt, for a time, delivered the Sudan

from Egyptian domination but did little to abate the strong
feelings each side held toward the other.6
The British conquest of Egypt in 1881 proved helpful to the
Sudan and the Mahdi Revolt.

Britain refused to entertain

Egyptian desires to re-conquer Sudan for fear that it would be
too costly.

But by 1895 it became clear Britain would have to

consolidate its control in the area and sent an Egyptian army to
defeat the Mahdi and his followers.

After four years of

fighting the Sudan was again under foreign control and the new
powers signed the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement in 1899.
Although on paper some power rested in Egypt’s hands, Britain
exercised full control over its new colony.7
Within the Sudan the old antagonisms never died.

Indeed,

British policy exacerbated the conflict between North and South.
The manifestation of both sides anger came after Britain
instituted the “Southern Policy.”

Although opposition to an

Arab dominated state had begun years before, the causes for the
war stem from British control and their implementation of this
policy;

a policy that split the country in two and pitted the

5

Carole Collins, “Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan,” MERIP
Reports 46 (April, 1976): 5.
6
Sam Sarkesian, “The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment,” African Studies
Review 16 (1973): 2.
7
Carole Collins, “Colonialism and Class Struggle”, 6
17

two sides against each other in a desperate battle for political
power and state resources.
The Southern Policy did not produce anger only in the
South. The north viewed any attempts at separating the north of
Sudan from the south as anathema.

Northern politicians based

their assumption of rule on what Ann Mosely Lesch calls the
Control Model;8 where adherents to this school of thought believe
conflict would have been avoided through the inevitable
Arabization of Southern Sudan had the British not stepped in.
However, Lesch points out that these Northern intellectuals do
not take into account the heterogeneous nature of the Sudan,
where Arab and Islam were not the dominant cultures and the
North/South conflict had been developing for many years prior to
the Southern Policy.9
Attempting to establish law and order, in 1898 the British
re-conquered the Sudan and maintained power until 1952.10
Understanding the harmful effects of slavery and unfair trade,
8

As articulated by Ann Lesch, the control model asserts that the
dominant culture within a state attempts to homogenize the state through
assimilation, predicated on the belief that as the dominant culture it has
the right to do so. This is in opposition to the Ethnic Pluralist Model,
which is a state where the government recognizes the different ethnic and
racial groups within society, creating a space for all groups within the
government. In a fairly extensive breakdown of Sudanese diversity, one can
see that only 40% of the people in Northern Sudan categorize themselves as
Arab, out of the 66% of the total population that live in Northern Sudan.
Lesch,Contested Identities, 8-10, and chart, 17.
9
North/South contention resulted in part from a history of Southern
enslavement by Northern Arabs and strong pressure for Southern Arabization
from the North.
10
Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” The Southern Sudan and the
Problem of National Integration, ed. Dunstan M. Wai (London: Frank Cass,
1973) 13.
18

the British closed off Southern Sudan from the North.
Northerners viewed the new restrictions as anti-Arab,
reactionary, and asinine.

These restrictions included, but were

not limited to: “the prohibition of Arabic, the abolition of
Arab names, the wholesale accusations against all Northerners of
being slave dealers, and the advantage given to Christian
missionaries over Moslem preachers.”11

Abel Alier12, a Southern

politician, claims that these measures proved overly zealous for
a policy enacted to preserve southern culture, an aspiration
essentially moral in nature
The British decided to manage the South differently from
the North prior to the implementation of a formal Southern
Policy in 1930.

The Civil Secretary’s formal articulation of

such a policy in 1930 established the Southern Sudan as
culturally distinct from the North and would therefore
along African, rather than Arab lines.”13
partition rendered policy.

“develop

Essentially, in 1930,

The British established Sudanese

government along a “series of self contained racial or tribal
units based…upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and
beliefs.”14

This policy left unanswered the question of to whom

11

Alier, “Southern Sudan Question,” 15.
Mr. Alier was a prominent member of the Southern Front, President of
the Regional Government in the Southern Sudan, Vice-President of the Sudan
and spokesman for the South at the Roundtable Conference.
13
Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2003) 11.
14
Appendix 1, “1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy”, in Southern Sudan
and National Integration, ed. Wai, 175.
12

19

the area of Southern Sudan would belong; whether it would stay
within the Sudan or go to the British East Africa Company.

The

Southern Policy coincided with the Closed District Ordinance of
1922 that restricted the movement of non-Southerners within
Southern Sudan.

These two policies further divided North and

South in their respective practices of government and
administration.
With their civilizing mission incomplete, the British did
not give much consideration to Sudanese independence. Much was
still to do by way of creating a stable nation-state.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, for the Sudanese, just prior to
World War II, a new crop of British civil servants made their
way to the Sudan, often working as low level assistants.

These

were the men born and bred in a time of great unrest, World War
I and the depression, and they questioned Britain’s long held
assertion of its right to possess and colonize foreign lands.15
These men, decades later, came to occupy the senior offices they
had earlier assisted.

Sir Douglas Newbold, appointed Civil

Secretary in 1939, became the patriarch for this progressive
group of civil servants.

Around this same time, Gordon College

and other Sudanese institutions began churning out graduates,
creating an educated elite class within society.

The educated

Sudanese challenged the British decision to allow Egyptian
15

Robert O. Collins, The British in the Sudan, 1898-1956, ed. Robert O.
Collins and Francis M. Deng (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984) 19.
20

officials back into the Sudan in 1936 and aspired to become
spokesmen for the nationalist cause in the Sudan.16

Through the

Graduates’ General Congress, these educated elites addressed
both the Sudanese people and the British government.

The

British, even with this new liberal and tolerant political
service at work in the Sudan, did not allow the Congress to
speak on behalf of the Sudanese people for independence.

This

effectively split the Congress into two halves, the moderate
Umma Party, which accepted British wisdom in the matters of
government, and an extremist party, Ashiqqa’ (Brothers), led by
Isma’il al-Azhari.17

Northerners dominated both of these

political parties and allowed Southerners a very small role in
any discussions.

Northern domination quickly became the

paradigm for Sudanese politics.
Sudanese politicians and the British did not officially
discuss the Southern Sudan until the Juba Conference of 1947, to
which they only invited eighteen Southerners.

According to the

Civil Secretary who called the meeting, Sir James Robertson, the
Juba Conference was not a meeting intended to create any new
policy.

Sir Robertson merely wanted to gauge the political

proficiency of the Southerners.

He states that he only invited

eighteen because “there were no provincial advisory councils in
the South at this time and so no way of electing representatives
16
17

Collins, British in the Sudan, 20.
Collins, British in the Sudan, 21.
21

to come to my Juba conference.”18

Robertson concluded that

Southerners employed sound political acumen and would,
therefore, not be dominated by the North within a unified
national assembly.
The British acceptance of a Sudanese legislative council
encompassing both halves of the Sudan angered many within Egypt,
most importantly King Faruq.

He summarily revoked the Anglo-

Egyptian treaty of 1936 and declared himself king of Egypt and
the Sudan.

In response, the British refused to acknowledge the

end of the treaty and proposed a “self-governing statute for the
Sudan in the Legislative Council.”19

However, self-determination

for the Sudan would not have been possible had Nasser not led
the Free Officers Revolution in Egypt in 1952.

With Egypt’s

old-guard out of power, Sudan had a new ally in their quest for
independence.

In 1952 all parties agreed to Sudanese

independence within three years and Sudan held its first
elections for a representative parliament in 1953.
however, quickly ensued.

Problems,

By voting for the NUP (National

Unionist Party), many Sudanese felt they were voting for
independence from Britain.

They realized by 1954 that they were

in fact voting for a party backed by Egypt, a sworn enemy of
many in the state, especially in the South.
18

They did not want

Sir James Robertson, Transition in Africa (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1974) 107.
19
Collins, British in the Sudan, 25.
22

their future tied to that of Egypt, sparking massive
demonstrations within Sudan and a mutiny by Southern soldiers of
the Equatoria Corps in 1955.20
Shortly thereafter, the first civil war began following the
soldiers’ mutiny in the southern town of Torit.

Southern fears

of Northern domination had long been simmering, but neither side
had yet to take up armed struggle.

The murder of Northern

civilians in the South by these soldiers can be seen as the
first casualties of this war, and the reaction by the North the
first counterattack.

The mutiny itself proved more helpful to

Sudanese sovereignty than Southern politics.

Britain no longer

wanted the responsibility of presiding over a country falling
precipitously into civil war.

Ironically, Southern armed

resistance was an attempt to force the British to notice the
South more and give it more rights within government.

According

to Douglas Johnson, “the final paradox of Sudanese independence
was that it was thrust upon the Sudan by a colonial power eager
to extricate itself from its residual responsibilities.”21
Independence was not predicated along a national sentiment and
was, therefore, doomed from the start.

Everyone in the Sudan

wanted independence, but the mechanisms were not in place to
ready everyone for it.

Coupled with the deep resentment between

the North and South, independent Sudan had but one option, civil
20
21

Collins, British in the Sudan, 25.
Johnson, Root Causes, 29.
23

war.
The deep schism between North and South Sudan was not that
the North was predominantly Muslim or that the South was
predominantly Christian or Animist.

Instead, the resentment

grew out of the North’s never ending attempt of Arabization in
the South.

As the majority group, the Arabs in the North

believed they had a right to assimilate the peoples of the South
into an Islamic republic, encompassing all of the Sudan.
is what inspired the South to take up arms.

This

Khartoum expelled

all Christian missionaries from the South in 1964 and
accompanied its attempt at Islamization with repressive
campaigns of terror against Southern populations in the late
1950s and early 1960s.22

Fearing possible arrest or execution,

many politicians in the South fled to border countries or the
bush.

Many politicians and academics formed political parties,

en émigré, fighting for Southern rights and freedoms.

In 1963,

the Anya Nya was established, comprised primarily of the 1955
mutineers, Southern police officers, and civil servants.

The

Anya Nya was the military wing of SANU (Sudan Africa National
Union) but quickly grew tired of politicians directing them from
exile.

Within the Sudan, the various Anya Nya regiments

coalesced under the leadership of Lt. General Joseph Lagu in
1970.
22

Johnson, Root Causes, 31.
24

With an opposition military in place, the civil war lacked
only a mass movement.

The Sudan did not have long to wait.

The

October Revolution of 1964 effectively ousted Gen. Abboud from
power, forcing him to relinquish control to a transitional
military council.

The revolution began after police opened fire

on a peaceful demonstration at the University of Khartoum.
These students strongly disliked the Khartoum military and many
sympathized with the Southern cause.

The police, not equipped

or trained to deal with riots, opened fire on the crowd killing
one and injuring nine.

At the funeral the next day, an angry

mob denounced the Abboud regime and the University of Khartoum
staff resigned in protest.

Professionals and non-professional

workers quickly joined the professors in protest.

On October

26, 1964, oppositional leaders called for a general strike.23
General Abboud agreed to hand over power and the revolution
proved a temporary success.
The new transitional government did not fare much better.
Led by Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa, Northerners saw the new
government as a concession to the Southern people.

A Northerner

well liked in the South, al-Khalifa viewed the “Southern problem
as a political question and not a military one.”24

Khartoum and

the Anya Nya were even able to negotiate a cease-fire.
23

But two

Mohamed Omer Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan (London:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1974) 215.
24
Kyle Keith, “The Sudan Today,” African Affairs 65 (1966): 239.
25

problems arose: the state of emergency was not lifted and the
Anya Nya had poor communications between its regiments.

In al-

Khalifa’s refusal to abrogate the state of emergency, the South
saw no real difference between the new government and the old
regime, leading to further animosity between the North and
South.

Second, poor communication within Anya Nya meant that

not everybody heard the cease-fire, which led to more fighting.
The Round Table Conference of 1965 proved another failure.
The Anya Nya continued their attack during the conference,
weakening the Sudan’s negotiating position.

Fighting kept the

South from voting in the 1965 elections and left the South with
no representatives in the new parliament.

The South did not do

much better in the 1968 elections, when power was still
concentrated in the hands of Islamist regimes in the North.

The

lack of members in parliament in 1965 allowed for the government
to unleash its security forces on the South under the guise of
restoring law and order.

The civil war intensified and Northern

soldiers arbitrarily murdered many unarmed civilians in the
South.

The parliament also kept up efforts to assimilate the

South into an all-Islamist country.25
The coup of 1969, orchestrated by Jafaar Numeiri, was seen
as an opportunity for a non-sectarian government and a possible
lull in fighting.
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secularist, he was still a highly authoritarian dictator with a
new policy focused on pan-Arabism.

Numeiri viewed the South as

an integral part of the Sudan and considered treasonous any
attempts at secession.

To combat the Southern troops, he

stationed two-thirds of his troops in the South and sporadically
attacked Anya Nya soldiers.26

Then, as soon as it started, it

seemed the fighting would come to an end, much to the
astonishment of everybody.

Both sides had grown weary of the

struggle and Numeiri realized his forces could not defeat the
Anya Nya as long as they continued their guerilla tactics.

For

the Anya Nya, their numbers were too small to openly attack
Numeiri’s forces and they could not win using its guerilla
tactics.

Both sides came to a standstill and wanted an end to

the fighting.
The Addis Ababa Peace Accords of 1972 effectively brought
to an end the first civil war in the Sudan.
the peace would not last.

But it was clear

Both sides failed to achieve any

victory at the negotiating table.

The whole Southern movement

had been predicated on the fight for independence from the
North, but the best they received from the treaty was regional
autonomy.

Khartoum began a campaign to eradicate Southern

forces, mainly the Anya Nya, and Arabize the people and the
land.
26

Numeiri managed to keep the Sudan together but had to
Sarkesian, “Southern Sudan,” 15.
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give autonomy to its provinces.

Clearly, neither side won.

Infighting marred both the North’s and the South’s
political positions giving the peace accords little chance of
surviving.

Southern politics came to be dominated by two men:

Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu.

Alier was president of the High

Executive Council (HEC) managing the South from 1972-1978 but
came to be seen as a supporter of Numeiri.

He allowed the

president to curtail Southern regional government authority,
which resulted in South having no control over its economy or
education.

Hoping for change, Southerners elected Joseph Lagu

president of the HEC in 1978.

As president, Lagu attempted to

replace the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the regional
government.

His subsequent fight with the judiciary led to a

temporary shutdown of the court system.

In response, Numeiri

dissolved the national and regional assemblies and held new
elections in which Alier was again elected president of the HEC.27
In the North, Numeiri felt pressure of his own.
Northerners did not appreciate the level of autonomy, however
paltry it was, afforded to the South in the Addis Ababa Peace
Accords.

Numeiri, up to this point, had received more support

from the South because of his concessions in the peace accords
than in the North.

Two coup attempts made him nervous of

outside forces, prompting him to issue a National Reconciliation
27
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that allowed all of those responsible for the coup attempts to
come back into the government.

Support from the South waned

with the new influx of Islamists back into the country.
The economy also declined.

Efforts to modernize its

agricultural capacity fell short and the Sudan was deeply
indebted to outside creditors by 1980.

In 1977-1978 the Sudan

was unable to pay its debts as they came due.

The United States

stepped in and restructured its debt, but the country remained
in very bad shape.

The National Reconciliation allowed for

Islamists to have a greater hand in government and welcomed the
ideas the United States put forward concerning privatizing the
Sudan’s public corporations.
banks for lines of credit.28

The government used all Islamic
With the economy in shambles Numeiri

searched for a way to advert the people’s attention.

His

answer: reintroduce Shari’a law and designate his country a
caliphate.

On September 23, 1983, Numeiri began his turn to

Islam by pouring bottles of whiskey into the Nile River.29

Not

only did this mark a new Islamic era within the Sudan, it also
set the date for the second civil war.
Southern troops stationed at the southern city of Bor, as
though it were 1955 all over again, mutinied after receiving
orders to transfer north.

With the constant reshuffling of

28

Johnson, Root Causes, 44.
Graham Thomas, Sudan 1950-1985: Death of a Dream (London: Darf
Publishers Ltd., 1990) 198.
29

29

presidents and governments, it proved difficult for Numeiri to
learn from past mistakes.

In an attempt to quell the uprising,

Khartoum requested John Garang, a member of the military, to
mediate a surrender.

Bor, after all, was his hometown so he was

a Southerner like them.

But there was just one problem; John

Garang was a Southerner like them!

He joined the mutineers and

managed to spread the uprising throughout most of the troops in
the South.

Similar to the mutineers of 1955, these newest ex-

soldiers fled into the bush and joined the Anya Nya II rebels.
This marriage proved unsuccessful and they fled further, mostly
into Ethiopia where they received support from President
Mengistu.

The resulting army and political operation was named

the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).30

Ethiopia

provided massive amounts of support for the rebels, including
artillery shells and air support for attacks on the North.

The

SPLM/A grew rapidly, amassing 20,000 troops by 1985.
In 1985 the Sudan witnessed the demise of Numeiri as
president.

The continuing war with John Garang and the SPLA

coupled with mounting protests in the streets and multiple
worker strikes brought the regime to its knees.

While on a

state visit to Washington, Numeiri’s Defense Minister, Abd alRahman Suwar al-Dhabab relieved Numeiri of duty and implemented
another transitional government, the Transitional Military
30
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Council (TMC).31

Having played a hand in Numeiri’s downfall, John

Garang believed the new leadership would be willing to talk
productively with the SPLM/A.

He received mixed messages from

the government and the TMC did not attend the meetings.
The National Alliance, however, did agree to meet with the
SPLM at Koka Dam.

On March 26, 1986, both parties sat down and

agreed to form a new Sudan, based on equal rights and an end to
racism.

They also agreed to contact the National Islamic Front

(NIF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to obtain their
agreement as well.

However, the National Alliance and SPLM

disagreed on the issue of holding elections.

Garang did not

want to hold any parliamentary elections prior to a new
constitution, a process that could not begin without the NIF and
the DUP, the primary members of the TMC.
Far from wanting to sign any peace accords, total
destruction of the SPLM consumed the NIF and Umma parties.

When

the DUP finally signed an accord with the SPLM, the Umma-NIF
majority blocked its approval through parliament.

The war

continued to rage and, finally, officers forced the prime
minister to decide on either gathering the force he needed to
defeat the SPLM or negotiating with them.32

Al-Mahdi, leader of

the Umma party, which held the largest block of seats in the
TMC, and therefore prime minister of the TMC as well, chose the
31
32
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latter and accepted the DUP-SPLM Accord into a new government.
Fearing a wane in power for the NIF, al-Mahdi attempted to end
the cease-fire that the government and the SPLM had agreed to
and suspend the accord between DUP and SPLM.

When it looked

like neither of those would happen, the NIF staged a coup and
Lt. General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Beshir came to power in 1989,
just days before Sadiq al-Mahdi was scheduled to meet Garang in
Addis Ababa.
As the civil war continued, the SPLM suffered multiple
setbacks as many within SPLM lost confidence in John Garang as a
leader.

The primary point of contention was Garang’s insistence

on staying in Ethiopia and helping Mengistu with the Ethiopian
civil war.
Mengistu.

Many within the SPLM viewed Garang as a puppet of
Reik Machar and Lam Akol voiced this opinion and

ultimately broke away to form their own wing of the SPLM.

War

quickly broke out between the two factions, primarily fighting
along lines of ethnicity; Garang’s SPLM was mostly Dinka while
Machar’s SPLM was mostly Nuer.

This shift toward intra-South

fighting brought war to the door steps of the civilian
population.

SPLA-Nasir (led by Machar) accepted support from

Khartoum in their struggle against Garang.

This allowed

Khartoum to move about Nasir territory free from harm, giving
them an upper hand in the South.33
33
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The first military success for the Garang’s SPLA (referred
to merely as SPLA) in some time came in 1995-1996 when it
launched a major offensive against government forces.

Most of

the government’s advances from 1992 were rolled back.

The newly

formed National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was integral to the
SPLA’s success.

This new coalition was formed from both

Northern and Southern opposition groups, encouraged by the other
states in the region.

But, a crisis in leadership still loomed

for the SPLA and the NDA.

A formal alliance between Khartoum

and anti-Garang forces led to rebellion within the Southern
forces and desertions to Garang’s SPLA.

This new success was

short lived as the Ethiopian-Eritrean war cut off supplies and
support to Garang’s forces.34

Khartoum had problems of its own as

Beshir and Hasan al-Turabi, the leading scholar for the Islamist
movement in the Sudan,35 fought each other for power.

Both

attempted to garner al-Mahdi’s support from the NDA.

He did

eventually return from exile and support Beshir.
summarily imprisoned.

Turabi was

As al-Mahdi left the NDA it began to

disintegrate, as did its coalition with the SPLA.36
An end to hostilities in the Sudan seems elusive, at best.
The North-South civil war constitutes but one such war raging

34

Johnson, Root Causes, 107.
Raghid El-Solh, “Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy: A Review of the
Ideas of al-Ghazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara,” British Society for Middle
Eastern Studies 20 (1993): 59.
36
Johnson, Root Causes, 108.
35

33

within the Sudan.

The peace initiatives of the twenty-first

century are the first steps in a very long journey toward peace.
The IGAD peace talks and Machakos Protocol are vital for the
peace process but fairly insignificant as one side or both
refuse to sign or obey them.

It seems self-determination for

the South remains a pipe dream, considering Khartoum’s campaign
sweeping through Darfur.
The Sudan’s interminable violence has garnered
international attention, reaching a fever pitch in the face of
genocide in Darfur.

Although peace remains perpetually elusive,

the United States Congress and U.S. television news outlets have
continued to investigate the Sudan’s civil wars.

Although well

intentioned, analysis emanating from Congress and news media
remain confused and incomplete.

International peace efforts in

the Sudan require a full understanding of the historical and
political roots of the conflict if they are to ever work.
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CHAPTER 3
OVER-SIMPLIFYING A COMPLEX CIVIL WAR
Simplifying this extremely nuanced and complex conflict
into the paradigm of Muslim vs. Christians, or Arab vs. Black
African, represents the most common impediment to understanding
and resolving the Sudan's civil war.

Both the media and U.S.

Congress are guilty of substituting the myriad causes of the war
with its mere components.

While the second war had a greater

degree of religious overtones, most scholars argue religion was
not its major cause, and the first civil war had little, if any
at all, to do with religion or race.

Indeed, geography and

distribution of resources accounted for more fighting than any
other reason.
The media fell into a pattern of presenting a superficial
view of the Sudanese conflict when the second civil war began in
the early 1980s after President Numeiri abrogated the Addis
Ababa Peace Accords, effectively ending 10 years of relative
peace.

President Jaafar Numeiri rose to power in the 1969 coup

that ousted the parliamentary government of the previous five
years.

He was part of a group that wanted a political end to

the civil war rather than the military solution championed by
preceding regimes in Khartoum.37

After ten years of peace,

Numeiri made the politically expedient decision to institute
37
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Shari'a law as the basis for Sudanese law.

This was a far cry

from his role as secularist at the beginning of his rule, and
some say it resulted from a personal awakening, but, whatever
the cause, it helped him to shore up support and placate some of
the more radical Islamists in the North.38

Whether political

expediency or personal revelation, it was this beginning to the
second civil war that media outlets and members of Congress used
to characterize the entire conflict.
The big three broadcast news networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS,
did not cover the nascent Sudanese Civil War until 1985.

Up to

that point their coverage of the Sudan focused on the famine and
Sudan's relationship with its neighbors.

Still, as these news

outlets began sending reporters to the Sudan, much of their
reporting focused on the growing humanitarian crisis, an aspect
of their coverage that is discussed later in this chapter.
Although reports on the Sudan are few and far between, 1986
proved a sort of watershed year for coverage on the Sudan.

In

an August 24 NBC broadcast, Mike Wildrich reported from the
Sudan that the civil war consisted of a Christian rebel movement
fighting an insurgency against a Moslem government.39

Later, in

a September 18 report, ABC used the same model for explaining
the recent violence, informing the viewer that Arabs, mostly
38
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Muslim, were fighting Christians, mostly Africans.40

Not only

did the second broadcast enter into the Muslim/Christian,
African/Arab dichotomy, but the reporter also saw it acceptable
to interchange Black Africans with Christians in their relation
to Arabs (essentially showing that Arabs are all Muslim and that
Black Africans are Christian and those terms are easily
interchangeable).
The same two television news networks engaged in the
simplification of the conflict in later reports as well.

In a

November 30, 1988, report on mass starvation and the
indifference of the leadership on all sides of the fighting, NBC
news correspondent Jim Bitterman referred to the SPLA as
"Christian rebels."41

In similar fashion, ABC broadcasts on

December 5, 1988, and March 31, 1989, both focused on the level
of Christian faith in the Sudanese refugees fleeing to Southwest
Ethiopia.

In an attempt to position the two religions against

each other, the refugees in the March 31, 1989, report were
described as mostly Christian and in support of the Southern
rebels against the Muslim North.42
In the 1990s, as the SPLA split and the Sudan endured even
greater violence, the news agencies became more explicit in
their coverage of the war.
40
41
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1993, Ron Allen, from location in the Sudan, tells viewers that
the north of the Sudan is mostly Arab and Muslim, while the
South is mostly African and Christian and that the civil war is
a clash between the two religions/races.43

And this view

prevails today, with a report as recent as a January 24, 2004,
Fox Evening News segment in which the reporter pitted a Muslim
government against Christian rebels.44
In total, thirteen out of a total of forty-six television
news broadcasts portrayed the Sudan's civil war as Arab vs.
African or Muslim vs. Christian.

Although the number thirteen

may seem small and insignificant, the other thirty-three
broadcasts did not speak to the reasons for the civil war and
the news reporters used the same paradigm throughout their
respective news channel's years of coverage, demonstrating an
engrained sense of understanding, however misplaced it may be.
The members of the Congressional committees that
investigated the civil war in the Sudan proved equally guilty of
buying into the paradigm of Arab vs. Black and Muslim vs.
Christian; members of Congress, Senators, and witnesses alike,
with some exceptions, entered into this naïve way of viewing the
Sudanese civil war.

Using a cross-section of Congressional

hearings starting in 1984, this thesis delineates the attitudes
and sentiments of U.S. legislators, and the experts they called
43
44
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to testify.
The scholars and government agents who testified as experts
on the Sudan proved to be the only attendees of these hearings
imploring the U.S. legislative bodies to look at the whole
picture of Sudanese history when developing a strategy to end
the civil war.

Indeed, many of the Congressional committee

members who convened hearings on the civil war in Sudan
commented on the war as though the first civil war had never
happened.

In a March 28, 2001, Subcommittee on Africa hearing,

Cynthia McKinney, of Georgia, referred to the "18 year old civil
war"45 currently ravaging the country.
only one.

And she was far from the

Eight years earlier, in a March 10, 1993, hearing,

Frank Wolf stated that the "Islamic fundamentalist government
has a clear history of intolerance of other religious groups,"
and that he was in agreement with a Southern Sudanese woman who
believed Khartoum targeted Southerners because of their
Christian beliefs.46
At some points witnesses and Congressional members stated
either falsehoods or wonderment at the facts on the ground in
the Sudan.

At the same hearing as Cynthia McKinney in 2001,

Representative Tom Tancredo, of Colorado, stated "it is true
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that you can look historically at the country of Sudan and say,
well, there was a time when this population apparently lived
together peacefully, but I think oil has changed everything."47
Lois Richards, then Acting Assistant Administrator for Food and
Humanitarian Assistance of the Agency for International
Development, in the March 10, 1993, hearing expressed surprise
at the fact that the Sudan had been at war with itself since
early on in its independence: "I was reminded by a colleague of
mine this morning who had served in the Sudan 27 years ago, that
there was a civil war then between the North and the South."48
Indeed, recognizing the breadth of misinformation and lack of
knowledge on the parts of the other witnesses and members of
congress, Robert O. Collins, at the same hearing as Ms.
Richards, implored his audience to "remember that this war has
been going on since 1965 with a ten year break from 1972 to
1983, this is not something that just began a few years ago."49
It would be naïve to argue that issues of religion and race
were not significant facets to the struggle between the
government in Khartoum and its combatants on the peripheries.
But that does not mean that they are the most important factors
or that solving these two issues will automatically bring peace.
47
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The underlying causes for the Sudan's second civil war reside in
deep-seated hatred and mistrust that go back to the mid 1800s.
Prior to the Turco-Egyptian regime, under the leadership of
Muhammad Ali, Arabs of the North and Africans of the South had
been separated by a large swamp area called the Sudd.

An 1839

excursion South from Khartoum opened up the Sudd for the first
time and allowed European and Arab traders and hunters to make
fortunes in the newly exposed land.50
Out of the Arab slave raids into the South emerged Southern
hatred of and mistrust toward the North.

The people of the

South identified themselves as African, even though they
belonged to disparate tribes and ethnicities, and fought hard to
keep their way of life.

The Arabs, on the other hand, used

Islam to justify their raids and expeditions south and believed
themselves validated in Arabicizing the entire region, a belief
that persists even today.51
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of the early 1900s put on
hold the Arab efforts to penetrate deeper into the South and
take total control.

The British discouraged interaction between

the Arabs of the North and the Africans of the South and quite
ably kept them apart.

After World War II the British granted

the Sudan independence and began a process of unification
50
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between the two regions.52
too deep.

But by then the divisions had grown

The two regions had only a half century of

interaction, and that based on exploitation of the South by the
North.

Indeed, both civil wars can be better understood as a

clash of nationalism, each side's nationalist views cultivated
through its forced separation.
Nationalism and nationalist identity are key factors in
understanding the Sudan's civil wars.

Fighting has been over

access to national and economic resources and "Sudan's conflict
since its inception had more to do with political and economic
hegemony than with ethnicity."53

An excellent example of this is

the current conflict in Darfur, an offshoot of the second civil
war.

There the media has mislabeled the combatants as “Arabs”

and “Black Africans”, when in actuality members of the Darfurian
political movements battling Khartoum "identify themselves as
Arabs, Afro-Arabs, and Africans" and adhere to differing degrees
of Islamic devotion.

The only thing they have in common is an

"opposition to the policies of the government in Khartoum and
their associated Militias."54
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTRA-SOUTH CIVIL WAR
Congress’ singular ability to simplify the Sudanese
conflict did not limit itself to its favored dichotomy, Arab vs.
African.

Congressional focus on this factual, yet ineffective,

dichotomy took attention away from the inter- and intra-ethnic
fighting in the South of the Sudan.

Long simmering under the

surface, ethnic conflict came to a head in the 1990s as the SPLA
split along ethnic lines.

A study of Congressional hearing

transcripts demonstrates an overwhelming failure to completely
understand the Southern cause.

Mention of ethnic violence is

few and far between, with an in-touch few imploring their
colleagues and congressmen to understand ethnic grievances as
they relate to the peace process.

In contrast to television

news, Congress seems extremely well-informed as TV news
broadcasts failed to mention the growing ethnic violence
altogether.
Of the twelve Congressional hearing transcripts in this
study, a paltry four hearings included testimony or questions
directly related to the burgeoning ethnic strife in Southern
Sudan.

Naturally, the preponderance of discussion rested

primarily in the hearings of the mid-1990s as it became more and
more obvious that ethnic violence, beyond that between Arabs and
Africans, would become a permanent plague on the peace process.
43

Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Affairs, proved prescient in his analysis of the
difficulties faced by the Sudan at the “Sudan: Problems and
Prospects” hearing on March 28, 1984.

Although probably not

cognizant of the implications of his words, he understood that
the Sudan was beset by problems common to all developing
nations; “economic difficulties, difficulties attending the
national integration of disparate in-tribe national elements and
infrastructural short-comings.”55

Koch deviated, however, from

later analysis of ethnic violence because he was an official in
an American presidential administration that supported President
Numeiri.

Naturally, he did not see ethnic differences as a

problem to be addressed, but rather a problem to be overcome in
an attempt for Numeiri to rule effectively.
In the 1990s, as ethnic violence heated to a boil, experts
and government officials addressed ethnicity as a problem to be
solved in order to achieve a peace settlement acceptable to
everyone.

Robert O. Collins, a historian and Sudanese expert

from the University of California, Santa Barbara, represents the
constant voice for understanding the Sudanese Conflict
historically and holistically.

His testimony at the hearing

“Recent Developments in Sudan,” on March 10, 1993, was
buttressed with testimony from Lois Richards and Herman Cohen,
55
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from the Agency for International Development and Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, respectively.

At the

time, ethnic mobilization began to manifest itself and SPLM/A
split into warring factions along ethnic lines.

This new

wrinkle presented problems for delivering food and supplies to
refugee camps and divided a tentatively united front for dealing
with the government in Khartoum.
As the situation in the Sudan grew steadily worse, the
militarization of ethnic identity56, especially amongst the Nuer
and Dinka, continued to solicit little discussion from
Congressional committee members and witnesses.

The omnipresent

Robert O. Collins was joined only by George Moose and Nelson
Kasfir in discussing this new war in the South at the hearing
“The Crisis in Sudan” on May 4, 1993.

Like most every other

Congressional hearing on the Sudan, most of the discussion
focused on the growing humanitarian disaster and the obstacles
presented by the Sudanese government and rebel groups to
delivering relief supplies.

It got to the point that Roger

Winter, a veteran of multiple hearings on the Sudan, called for
a more politically centered discussion of the conflict and
believed “dwelling on the humanitarian can be an excuse, can
draw attention from the need for clear, politically based
56
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policy.”57
Roger Winter was not the only American government official
to observe the growing tension in the South of Sudan.

George

Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
understood the challenge of a fractured opposition in the South.
He knew the Abuja Peace Conference of 1993 would never work
because Khartoum and John Garang refused to allow for broader
participation.

Indeed, Moose expressed concerns that resolving

the intra-SPLA conflict would prove to be as vital to the peace
process as ending the war between Khartoum and the SPLA.
Nelson Kasfir, professor at Dartmouth University, seconded this
very notion.

For Kasfir, a SPLA split resulted in reduced

bargaining power because a single opposing force emanating from
the South could have more easily forced the government of Sudan
to reach a settlement.58
As menacing as the incestuous war seemed, intra-SPLA
fighting amounted to little more than a flash in the pan for
both members of Congress and the experts testifying at their
hearings.

A cross section of subsequent hearings saw that

Congressional officials continued to call before them experts on
refugees, humanitarian assistance, and slavery.

Politicians

paid little attention to the historical roots to the conflict or
57
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to the fighting in the South.

Instead of a clear political

discussion on how best to broker peace, the hearing was muddled
by continued focus on the Muslim/Christian dichotomy,
humanitarian assistance, and what it all means for the United
States of America.

In the March 22, 1995, hearing, also

entitled “The Crisis in Sudan,” Edward Brynn was the only person
to communicate the urgency of ethnic fighting in the South.
Even he could not resist the lure of religious terminology.
While he established that the Sudan is comprised of multiple
ethnic groups, he conceded that the historical divide was
between a Muslim North and a Christian/Animist South.59
The new millennium witnessed a drastic change in the
dominant discussion on the Sudan at Congressional hearings.

The

genocide in Darfur, which will be discussed in greater detail
later, replaced religion, the humanitarian crisis in the South,
and ethnic fighting as the dominant issue.

While the situation

in Darfur focused much more attention on the Sudan, it
distracted American policy makers from making a concerted effort
to help the Sudan forge a lasting peace.

Donald Payne,

Representative from New Jersey, went so far as to argue that
addressing the root causes of the war represented the best path
for an attainable peace.

He then pointed to oil, petrol-

dollars, as a key facilitator and cause of the war and the
59
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genocide in Darfur, apparently believing the war started just
recently and he is perhaps disingenuous in calling for a better
understanding of the root causes.60

Cynthia McKinney,

Representative from Georgia, furthered that same notion,
pointing to the oil as a catalyst for the war and genocide.

The

most egregious misunderstanding of the war, however, belongs to
Tom Tancredo, representative from Colorado.

Mr. Tancredo

claimed that “it is true you can look historically at the
country of Sudan and say, well, there was a time when this
population apparently lived together peacefully, but I think oil
has changed everything.”61
The caveat that “oil has changed everything” implies that
prior to the discovery of oil, the ethnic groups inhabiting the
South of Sudan and the Arabs of the North got along peacefully,
if not harmoniously.

This argument further implies that the

second civil war existed independent of the first and fails to
take into account violence before, and irrespective to, the
discovery of oil.
The primary impetus for the largely invisible conflict in
the South was a clash of ideology, a “war of visions.”62

Congress

and television news reports focused so intently on ascribing a
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grand narrative for the war, between North/South, Arab/African,
Muslim/Christian, they failed to see the smaller wars brewing in
other parts of the country.

An ironic take on an arboreal

expression, Congress and TV news reporters failed to see the
trees for the forest.

Congress’ and TV news media’s failure to

understand the political dynamics of the South led to their
bewilderment at the onset of intra-South conflict, limiting
their ability to report accurately, or at all as was seen in
this case, or provide effective assistance.
The primary ethnicity, that is the ethnicity with the most
power within the state, is Arab, which makes up roughly 40
percent of the population.

The Islamists, who are a part of the

Arab identity, control the government and lead the fight against
Southern rebels.

Ann Mosely Lesch, Sudanese expert, categorizes

the Islamist government as belonging to the Control Model, where
“the state tries to undermine and even destroy other ethnic
national groups that exist within its boundaries, whether by
assimilation or repression.”63 It is within this context that the
Nuer and Dinka find themselves, leading the South against a
repressive Islamist government and, since the eruption of interethnic violence within the South, against each other.

The

Southern ethnic groups, especially those fighting Khartoum,
identify themselves as African and view the Arabs of the North
63
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as the enemy.
Competition for natural, not political, resources define
the historical relationship between ethnic groups in Southern
Sudan.

A heavy reliance on cattle caused conflict between

migrating tribes over grazing land and intricate bride-wealth
systems.

In the eighteenth century the Nuer were the most

aggressive tribes in Southern Sudan.

Their bride-wealth system,

where the bride’s family receives cattle from the groom’s family
as payment for the woman‘s lost services, could require a
groom’s family to relinquish as much as forty head of cattle.
The sheer cost, then, of marriage required Nuer families to
maintain large herds of cattle, prompting them to seek huge
swaths of land that brought them into direct competition with
other cattle herding tribes.64
effect.

Arab slave raids had the same

Nuer fleeing east from Arab slavers conquered the

tribes who put up resistance, mostly Dinka, and assimilated them
into their groups.

Indeed, the Nuer populations “increased

fourfold” during this period.65
The first half of the twentieth century saw a marked
decrease in the relative violence between Nuer and Dinka.

The

reasons can be traced back to the Turco-Egyptian rule from 1821-
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1885, better known as the Turkiyya.

This period saw a massive

increase in slave raids on the African tribes of the Sudan as
Arabs needed workers and soldiers.

The Turkiyya ended Dinka

dominance in the South and preoccupation between ethnic groups.
“Now, externally generated traumas would equally, although not
exclusively, consume the lives of Southern people.”66

Douglas

Johnson made note of the same phenomena; “Eastern Jikany (Nuer)
quickly changed from being harassers of the Northern Dinka to
becoming their protectors against Turco-Egyptian raids.”67
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from 1898-1952 was the
greatest period of calm between the Nuer and Dinka.

Under the

“Nuer Settlement Policy” of the 1920s and 1930s, Nuer were
separated from their Dinka neighbors.

It was part of a

“pacification campaign” by the British against the Nuer.68

The

new laws forbade the Nuer from raiding cattle from other tribes
and created a no man’s land between the Nuer and Dinka.

The

British abrogated this policy in 1936 and drew up plans to merge
the Nuer and Dinka tribes into a single political unit.

All of

this was under the umbrella of the Southern Policy, enacted in
1930 to stem the violence in Southern Sudan, pacify all of the
peoples, and stop Arabs from taking advantage of the lesser
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developed Southerners economically.69 The British abrogated the
plan for cohesion along with its Southern Policy in favor of
Sudanese unity in preparation for independence.
The separation became a problem when the British did not
attempt to increase infrastructure and development within the
South to compete with the North. There were too few schools to
educate and train the people and no government secondary schools
to create a politically astute class of civil servants.
Ann Mosely Lesch illustrates the disparity between the
North and South economies by analyzing the per capita gross
domestic product in 1956; people living in greater Khartoum
earned 119 Sudanese Pounds whereas people living in the three
Southern provinces earned only twelve Sudanese Pounds.70

The

effects of the Southern Policy were compounded by its sudden
abandonment “on the eve of the imperial withdrawal.”

Dunstan

Wai opines that the real “crime” against the Southerners was not
in the Southern Policy‘s adoption, for he thinks it was the
right policy, but was “its abandonment and the political
unification of the two disparate regions.”71
Southern Sudanese politics after independence revolved
around the issue of secession from, or unity with, the Arab
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government seated in Khartoum.

During the first civil war, from

1955 to 1972, there was more or less a pan-African feel to the
movement; mass cooperation between many of the ethnic groups
supplanted inter-ethnic violence.

Allan Reed, who spent ten

months with Anya Nya forces in 1971, saw a great deal of interethnic cooperation.

He commented on the ease with which Dinka

troops traveled through historically non-Dinka territory and
concluded that “there is a genuine Southern Sudanese nationalism
now that crosses over tribal boundaries.”72

The Anya Nya

themselves did not make a point to distinguish between
ethnicities relative to the total war effort.

According to the

Anya Nya, it was “fighting for freedom for the people of
Southern Sudan-freedom to determine their own cultural,
religious and linguistic character.

Freedom to be African.”73

The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, signed in 1972 in
Ethiopia, ushered in an eleven-year period of uneasy peace and
ceasefire.

The South was granted regional autonomy and it

looked as though there would be the chance for a referendum on
Southern self-determination.

Those hopes were dashed when

President Jafaar Numeiri, the same man who brought the
belligerents to the peace table, abrogated the peace agreement
72
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by instituting Shari’a Law in the North.

Islamization and

Arabization were renewed as policies for the government and
Southern militias took up arms once again to defend against what
they saw as Arab domination.

More important was the ethnic

violence, primarily amongst Nuer and between Nuer and Dinka,
that became a part of the second civil war in the late 1980s.
The 1980s saw a drastic increase in Nuer on Nuer violence,
primarily consisting of spear attacks between close kinsmen.
But Nuer fighting Nuer was nothing new.
rife with intra-Nuer violence.

The 19th century was

Compensation for homicide was

similar to bride payment and acted as a “redistributive
mechanism” for cattle.74

The new ethnic violence during the

second civil war hardened ethnic identities and fractured an
already fragile commitment between the parties to fight the
North.
Intra-South violence prior to 1991 paled in comparison to
the destruction wrought by the split in the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA).

It is difficult to ascertain

the exact role of ethnicity in causing the SPLA split.

Riek

Machar and Lam Akol were the leaders of the breakaway faction
SPLA-Nasir.

Machar was a native Nuer and most of the

militarized Nuer simply followed him into the new SPLA.

This

left the Dinka to stay with their fellow tribesman, John Garang.
74
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“Confined to the highest ranks of the SPLA leadership, this
political rift soon sparked off a full-scale military
confrontation between the two largest ethnic groups in the
South, the Dinka and Nuer.”75
It proved tough for non-Dinka members of the political
class to overlook John Garang’s dictatorial style.

Many, both

inside and outside the rebel movement, perceived the SPLA “as a
Dinka movement inspired by traditional Dinka concerns and
aspirations.”76

Joseph Lagu, former commander of Anya Nya

forces, accused the Dinka of dominating the SPLA and paying
little regard to other ethnic groups.77
a point of divisiveness.

Political aims were also

Lam Akol “persuaded Riek Machar to

support secession and try to overthrow Garang,”78 who wanted to
keep the North and South unified.

The lack of democratization

within SPLA ranks and a clear split in political ideology
precipitated “personal grievances and rivalries that had been
brewing over a period of time” that could not be overcome
through diplomacy.79
The conflict between the disparate ethnicities of the
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South, especially the Nuer and Dinka, devolved into a brutal
tit-for-tat.

While the breakaway SPLA factions decried Garang’s

human rights abuses and lack of democracy, ironically, they did
not seem to mind committing human rights atrocities of their
own.

In one particular response to a Nuer raid against a Dinka

village, a Dinka officer rounded up unsuspecting Nuer civilians
and executed them.80
Intra-ethnic fighting in Southern Sudan further complicated
U.S. Congressional and media attempts at understanding and
describing the civil war. In the 1980s Congressional members and
media reporters overlooked the ethnic fighting in favor of a
focus on Cold War politics.

United States politicians viewed

the Sudan as a possible ally in the Cold War and constructed
foreign policy around political expediency.

The end of the Cold

War allowed members of Congress and the media to shed Cold War
paradigms, but they instead focused on the humanitarian issues
instead of a political solution to the fighting, both in the
South and the larger civil war.
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CHAPTER 5
COLD WAR POLITICS
The Sudan’s second civil war presents a significant case
study in Cold War politics as it relates to United States’
foreign policy.

The second war began in the early 1980s after

President Numeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and
re-implemented Shari’a law, angering non-Muslim Southerners on
both accounts.

At its onset U.S. policy makers experienced

confusion in creating a monolithic U.S. policy toward the
escalating civil war.

Numeiri was an ally to the West, with his

fight against communists in his own country, while the Sudan
occupied an important geo-strategic position along the Red Sea,
a possible gateway between the Arab World and Black Africa.
Attitudes toward Numeiri and the Southern opposition were
redefined, effectively switched, and policy positions hardened
as the Cold War ended, allowing for a more objective approach to
understanding the conflict.
The most effective way to demonstrate the Cold War
paradigm lies in how Congress and television news broadcasts
portray the two central organizations in this tragedy, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the government of Sudan
(Khartoum).

This study will use the year 1992 as the break

point for reporters and congressional officials no longer using
the Cold War paradigm to analyze the Sudanese conflict.
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In the 1980s, with the Cold War still dominating foreign
policy considerations, news coverage of the Sudan seemed
slightly confused.

While television reporters made it clear

that both sides were to blame for the growing humanitarian
disaster, they found it difficult to assign one side the role of
villain.

But with Cold War terminology so prevalent, issues of

national sovereignty reigned supreme rendering rebellion a
nuisance in need of suppression.

It is in this light that

television news coverage portrayed the SPLA and Khartoum.
Khartoum’s position as an ally in America’s fight against
communism also helped in assigning judgment between the SPLA and
the government of Sudan.
In the period between 1983 and 1992, television news
networks covered some aspect of the Sudanese conflict twenty-two
times.

In the early years of the civil war the media covered

Sudan’s political machinations as they related to U.S. foreign
policy.

Sudan borders both Libya and Ethiopia, two countries

that at that time enjoyed strong ties to the Soviet Union.

Not

unexpectedly, American coverage of the Sudan slanted toward
these issues.

In the late seventies and early eighties,

political coverage of the Sudan centered on President Numeiri’s
expulsion of Soviet advisers following the Sudan communist
party’s short-lived coup.

The news outlets clearly placed

Numeiri and the Sudan in the camp of the United States and the
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West, a de facto friend of America.

Before the rebellion began

in earnest, coverage of Southern rebels kidnapping American
missionaries and their subsequent rescue by Sudanese troops
squarely put Southern demands and military excursions at odds
with American sentiment.
After the war started, coverage shifted toward the nascent
humanitarian disaster throughout Sudan.

Ten of the twenty-two

news segments covering the Sudanese conflict depicted the SPLA
as the main obstacle to peace and prosperity, mostly due to
their hindering of relief supplies.

Famine and drought ravaged

the country and humanitarian assistance dominated the coverage.
Reporters credited the SPLA with shooting down relief planes,
threatening further attacks on relief efforts, and open
rebellion against the government.

While all those claims were

true, and reports often claimed that both sides were to blame
for the famine and death, little coverage was given to
Khartoum’s complicity in perpetuating the war and its use of
food as a weapon.

Of the twenty-two new segments between 1983

and 1992, not a single report explicitly blamed the government
of Khartoum for waging a religious/ethnic war against nonMuslims and Africans in the South.

Although a few made it clear

that there existed animosity between a Muslim government and a
non-Muslim South, that line of thought was never fully fleshed
out and the viewer was left with an incomplete picture.
59

From 1992 to 2007 television news networks covered the
Sudan twenty-eight times, invariably focusing on the
humanitarian relief efforts.

However, because the Cold War had

ended, news reporters gained a clearer sense of how to assess
blame and freed themselves from the Cold War paradigm.

Of the

twenty-eight segments, six of them clearly portrayed the
Khartoum government as the villain, with only one assigning the
SPLA to that role.81

Notice that neither time period contained a

news segment that depicted the SPLA nor the government of the
Sudan as the protagonist, i.e. nobody is good.

In those

segments that do not assign blame, they are fully devoted to the
economic and humanitarian crises.
United States’ Congressional hearings demonstrate the
clearest transformation from Cold War politics to a more
altruistic based foreign policy toward the Sudan.

Discussions

about the geo-strategic importance of the Sudan dominated
Congressional hearings in the 1980s.

Situated along the Red Sea

and its close proximity to both the Arab world and Black Africa,
the Sudan presented prime real estate for Cold War political
maneuvering.

The ability to control the Red Sea, with its

importance as a trade route from the Mediterranean Sea to the
Indian Ocean, presented an opportunity gain the upper hand
against the Soviet Union.
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but not necessarily the views of, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, concluded that the Sudan “is politically and
strategically important to the United States,” with important
borders with Libya and “communist Ethiopia.”82
In a 1981 hearing, “Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle,”
Representative Howard Wolpe expressed the concern of “many
Americans [that] Libya will exploit political strains in
Northern Africa in order to foster political change that would
be detrimental to American interest” following the assassination
of Anwar al Sadat, president of Egypt.83

To shore up further

western support within the Sudan, Wolpe went on to float the
idea of more economic aid in addition to the military support
already allocated.

Presiding over another hearing on the Sudan

in 1984, “Sudan: Problems and Prospects,” Wolpe delineated
American support for the Sudan; twenty to twenty-five percent of
African Aid goes to the Sudan, with American planes patrolling
Sudanese skies to deter Libyan attacks.84
At that same 1984 hearing, Noel Koch, Deputy assistant
Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, pointed
to the same outside agitators, Libya and Ethiopia, and seconded
the opinion that Sudan “occupies a critical position on the
82
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African continent.”85

Princeton Lyman, Deputy assistant Secretary

of State for African Affairs, best summed up the official
government attitude for the Reagan Administration: “President
Numeiri shares major U.S. objectives in the region, countering
Soviet influence in the Arab World and Africa.”86

Unable to look

beyond Cold War politics, both Lyman and Koch went on to
congratulate President Numeiri for ending the first civil war in
1972 and touted the value of America’s friendship with the
Sudan.
In 1989, a few years into the second civil war, attempts to
define the SPLA as anathema to the goals of both the United
States and Sudan picked up in earnest.

In the March 2, 1989,

hearing, “Politics of Hunger in the Sudan,” Representative
Howard Wolpe used the term “Southern insurgents” in reference to
the SPLA87 and Kenneth Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, reemphasized America’s long standing
friendship with Khartoum.

In a bit of unintended irony, Brown

asserted that the United States “will continue to seek an end to
external interference in Sudan,”88 implying Ethiopia and Russia
while not realizing he could just as easily be referring to the
United States.
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Robert O. Collins and Roger Winter, among others, noticed
the underlying current of Congressional members’ animosity for
the SPLA and overly friendly attitudes toward Khartoum.

In 1981

Collins considered it a “very serious mistake” to place Khartoum
in either camp vis-à-vis the Cold War, citing its inconsistent
foreign policies.

He cited economic problems as the major

obstacle to Sudanese viability and rejected as “detrimental”
large military aid packages from the U.S. to the Sudan.89

Douglas

Johnson, another historian and Sudanese expert, in 1984 ventured
that Khartoum would use Cold War politics to garner U.S.
assistance and that Numeiri was bent on establishing an Islamic
state within the Sudan.90

Roger Winter in 1989 was more explicit.

He rejected the notion that the SPLA is America’s enemy simply
because it is backed by Ethiopia, an ally of the USSR.

Instead,

he called for rethinking U.S.’s relationship with Khartoum,
citing that most of the starvation has occurred in government
controlled areas.91

At the same hearing, a point of ironic levity

elicited derisive laughter from the audience after Kenneth Brown
assured the panel that the United States would guarantee that
Khartoum would not use American military equipment in the
South.92
Congressional inquiries on the Sudan shifted from issues of
89
90
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American hegemony in a bi-super power world to human rights and
combating terrorism following the end of the Cold War.

The

United States no longer needed an ally in a theoretical war
against the Soviet Union.

That fact alone allowed U.S. policy

makers to shift their attention from “what can the Sudan do for
America?” to “what should America be doing for the Sudan?”

With

this new attitude came a much more critical view of the Sudanese
government.
George Moose clearly defined the growing sentiment in the
United States toward the Sudan at the May 4, 1993, hearing “The
Crisis in Sudan”; “America’s values do not permit us to sit idly
by while civil war rages and human rights are systematically
abused.”93

At the same hearing James Kunder, a veteran of various

U.S. government and nongovernmental Aid organizations, points
out that the Sudan is fully one-third the size of the United
States.

Understanding that the Sudan is a large swath of land,

Kunder makes it clear that many obstacles stand in the way of
effectively delivering aid.

In addition to logistical

hindrances, many Sudanese were quite averse to foreign aid
workers.94

Noting that the situation in the Sudan had remained

static, Roger Winter believed that the U.S. had no clear policy
toward the Sudan other than waiting and watching.95
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important than what was said is what was not said.

In no

question or answer did participants discuss the geo-strategic
importance of the Sudan.

Indeed, participants geared much of

the discussion to the humanitarian disaster and possibilities
for United States’ help; “the overriding American interest is
the suffering of innocent people.”96
Although U.S. policy makers and experts viewed secular
governments as benign in themselves, many became alarmed with
Khartoum’s campaign of forced Islamization in the South, its
support for Islamic terrorist organizations, and its harboring
of international terrorists, most notably Osama bin Laden.

With

the threat of terrorism, the hearing concerning “The Crisis in
Sudan” on March 22, 1995, saw a reversion to a more selfish
foreign policy, but one borne out of self-preservation and not
the perpetuation of American hegemony.

Representative Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen believed Khartoum’s support for insurgency groups
and international terrorists presented enough of a reason to no
longer view the Sudan as primarily a humanitarian issue but as a
threat to U.S. security.97

Clearly, Khartoum was no longer the

friend to the United States it was during the Cold War.
As the United States became less and less enthralled with
Khartoum’s politics, members of Congress and witnesses shifted
96
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toward a friendlier attitude with regard to the SPLA and other
opposition groups.

The most glaring reversal of opinion on the

SPLA arose between Kenneth Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Africa in the Bush Administration (1989), and John
Prendergast, a Sudanese expert in the Clinton Administration.
In 1989 Kenneth Brown testified that a cease fire was an
integral part to any peace agreement and military gains by the
SPLA undermined any chance for peace negotiations.98

In 1995

Prendergast directly contradicted Brown’s statements.

Lamenting

the SPLA split, Prendergast testified that Khartoum would not
negotiate a peace settlement unless there was another stalemate
that was unlikely with a disunited opposition.99

This

disagreement clearly demonstrates the reversal of attitudes
toward Khartoum and the SPLA, from an earlier U.S. official
calling for the SPLA to stop fighting to a later U.S. official
calling for a stronger Southern opposition.
If the 1990s saw a more critical American view of Khartoum,
the new millennium saw Khartoum’s complete vilification.
genocide in Darfur dominated Congressional discussion.

The
One

needs to look no further than the Congressional hearing titles
to understand the topic of discussion: “Consolidating Peace
While Confronting Genocide”; “Darfur Peace and Accountability
98
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Act”; and “The Current Situation in Sudan and Prospects for
Peace.”

Without exception, experts and members of congress

alike portrayed Khartoum as the uber-villain bent on wiping out
a whole population.

The genocide is covered in the concluding

chapter, and the monolithic condemnation of Khartoum throughout
the Congressional hearings since the genocide started renders an
explanation of nuance here pointless.

For these hearings,

Khartoum was evil and any opposition seemed heroic.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Failure to understand the myriad nuances and idiosyncrasies
of the Sudanese civil wars has bedeviled the U.S. Congress and
television news outlets alike.

Falling victim to

oversimplification, reporters and congressional representatives
used tired clichés in explaining complex and sometimes
contradictory attitudes between the combatants.

Often, they

would either use ineffectual dichotomies left over from the
first civil war to explain the second, or fail to grasp nascent
rivalries that proved prevalent in the second, such as the
Muslim/Christian dichotomy in the former and the intra-South
fighting in the latter.

As for the Cold War, it seems they did

not realize they were engaging in Cold War paradigms while
reporting on and investigating the Sudan.
While many members of congress as well as television
reporters embraced the Sudan with good intentions, it became
painfully obvious that they focused on aspects of the war that
had little to do with its resolution.

The overwhelming majority

of news reports and Congressional discussions dealt primarily
with the humanitarian crisis and did little to contribute to
finding a political solution.

Some of the experts testifying

before Congress understood this problem and informed the
respective committees.
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Delivering relief supplies to those in need became a
struggle in itself for the relief agencies working in the Sudan.
With no political solution in sight, relief organizations
battled Khartoum and the SPLA for access to refugees in their
respectively held areas.

It turned into a major point of

contention in 1986 when the SPLA shot down a plane carrying
relief to Sudanese citizens.100

Following the attack, the SPLA

vowed to shoot down any plane flying over their territory based
on the belief that the planes carried supplies to Northern
soldiers.

Naturally, the relief agencies denied the accusation,

but little came of it.

Politics and military strategy proved to

be the largest impediments to relief work.
Reporters sent to cover the Sudan quickly realized that
much of the food and supplies devoted to starving citizens sat
in hangers and on tarmacs waiting for a politically stable
window to begin airlifts.

To their credit, the news coverage

highlighted the reality that Khartoum and the SPLA were using
food relief as a weapon.

By not allowing relief supplies to go

through, each side could curtail the other’s willingness to
fight.

However, the people suffering the most continued to be

the innocent civilians.

In a war full of ironies, the most

brutal was the fact that some starving people were so hungry
they could not physically eat.
100
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often too late.
The focus of Congressional hearings and television news on
the humanitarian aspect of the brutal conflict persisted well
into the twenty-first century.

The newest conflict to suffer

from this acute lack of understanding is the genocide in Darfur.
Although the international community, most notably the United
Nations and the United States, officially recognized the
violence in Darfur as genocide, little has been done to rid the
area of the systemic violence that has plagued the area since
the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Like the civil wars

before it, the genocide in Darfur will only end with a political
solution.

As the Sudan creeps ever closer to a new civil war,

and violence begins to dominate the landscape again, the need
for a political solution to the Sudan’s ills has never been
greater.
Darfur is the commonly used name for the area of western
Sudan that was once dominated by the Fur people101, encompassing
about 508,000 square kilometers.102

Fur allegiance to the Nile

River area, modern day Sudan, resulted from fuqura evangelism in
Darfur.

Fuqura, “holy men from the Nile,” converted the Fur to

Islam, instilling a deep devotion in the Fur to Islam and the
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Nile region.

The Fur sultan Muhammed Tayrab extended the

kingdom to the Nile valley in 1787, conquering the lesser
sultanates in his way and engaged in the international trade of
the period.103
The British incorporated Darfur into the greater AngloEgyptian Condominium in 1916.

Now a part of the Sudan, the

British implemented indirect rule, resulting in what Gerard
Prunier calls “colonial benign neglect.”104

Claiming a respect

for native authority, British authorities divided the region
into small areas of personal rule by local chiefs.

Local chiefs

and Condominium authorities alike did little to advance
education or economic infrastructure in the region.

Shielded

from the rest of the Sudan for its entire Condominium life,
Darfur was ill-prepared for incorporation into a new,
independent state when the Sudan gained independence in 1956.105
Like Southern Sudan, Darfur received little assistance or
attention from Khartoum.

Following World War II Darfur received

even less attention as international organizations and foreign
nations pumped money into Southern Sudan.
distrustful of Khartoum.

Darfur grew even more

The drought of the 1960s exacerbated

the already established tensions between Darfur and the more
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urban areas.

The wells built by the Sudanese government to

combat the drought added to the problem.

The water supply

attracted herds of camel and nomads with their own cattle in
search of water.

The traditional farmers of Darfur turned into

shepherds as only small shrubbery would now grow in their
fields.

Competition between nomads, with their herds, and

Darfurian shepherds occasionally turned violent, reviving long
simmering rivalries.106
In 1975 the rains came back.

They did not last.

In 1982

the drought resumed in earnest and spread from the Red Sea to
the Atlantic Ocean.

To make matters worse, Numeiri’s

politically expedient conversion to Islam and imposition of
Shari’a law precipitated more rebellion throughout the South,
leading to the second civil war.

The transitional government

that replaced President Numeiri in 1986 did little to mitigate
the rising tide of mistrust between the periphery and the
center.

Shari’a law continued unabated and the National Islamic

Front under General Omar el Beshir took power in 1989.

Khartoum

hoped to kill two birds with one stone by giving arms to
militias in Darfur to use against Southern rebels.

Tribes in

Darfur have a long history of antagonism with Southern tribes,
which Khartoum hoped to capitalize on.107
106
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The combination of drought, which led to greater
competition for resources, and hardened ethnic identity led to
open hostility between Arab militias and the native tribes of
Darfur.

Under the guise of “deep seated tribal conflict,”

Khartoum prosecuted a proxy war against rebelling Darfurians
using Arab militias.108

In the early 1990s the NIF government

began the violent process of cleansing the Darfur region of nonArab ethnicities, primarily the Fur.

What was once the natural

outcome of competition for resources, violence in Darfur became
a state-sponsored enterprise with a racist ideology.109
Two non-Arab political groups formed in 2003 avowing armed
conflict against the NIF government to gain political autonomy
and an equitable wealth-sharing agreement for Darfur; Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).110
Unable and unwilling to transfer troops from the South, Khartoum
instead fostered its relationship with Janjaweed, a
heterogeneous Arab-militia comprised of “former bandits and
highway men who had been in the trade, since the 1980s;
demobilized soldiers from the regular army; young members of
Arab tribes having a running land conflict with a neighboring
‘African’ group-most appeared to be members of the smaller Arab
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tribes; common criminals who were pardoned and released from
gaol if they joined the militia; fanatical members of the
Tajammu al-Arabi; and young unemployed ‘Arab’ men.”111
The genocide in Darfur continues, unabated, through today.
The major obstacle to peace seems to be convincing the primary
actors that peace can actually work.

The SLA and JEM embraced

violence as their last resort, rendering it difficult to accept
any other option.112

Darfur’s violence has a long history and

cannot be separated from the civil war at large.

Its roots lie

in the same fertile ground that produced the Sudan’s civil wars;
namely the precipitous removal of the colonial apparatus and
ethnically stoked conflict.

Darfur’s genocide, just like the

greater civil war, requires an overhaul of the Sudan’s political
structure.

“With only vague demands for accountability from the

international community,” Khartoum has been able to prosecute
wars of aggression throughout its entire periphery.113

Indeed,

just like the United States’ failure to fully comprehend the
enormity of the Sudan’s civil war, the world at large continues
to bury its head in the sand, refusing to take bold action
against Khartoum.
The sad fact is that violence defines political differences
and aspirations in the Sudan.
111
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positions of the combatants as well as the contradictory
policies emanating from disparate political groups in the South
and Khartoum

made it difficult for the U.S. Congress and

national media to

comprehend the war’s complexity and nuance.

This chronic lack of understanding has limited the United
States’ ability to effectively work toward substantive change in
the Sudan.

Indeed, Robert Collins had it right: the United

States has had little more to offer the Sudan than “tea and
sympathy.”114
United States’ limited abilities to effect change in the
Sudan has not deterred it from trying.

The daunting task of

helping to bring an end to such an enduring, intractable war has
proven quite difficult.

The threat of terrorism has added a

new, more immediate wrinkle to U.S. involvement in the Sudan.
The Bush administration, however, has not used the “War on
Terror” as a new raison d’être to become involved in Sudanese
politics.

The U. S. goal remains ending the war, rebuilding

southern Sudan, and resolving the genocide in Darfur.

Astutely,

John Danforth, U.S. special envoy to the Sudan, sees “America’s
own preoccupations with identity politics and minority rights”
in the Sudan’s conflict.115

While autonomy for the South remains

the primary stumbling block for peace talks, Danforth decided
that the United States would not seek self-determination for the
114
115
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South as a pre-condition in U.S. sponsored peace talks.
The latest attempts at peace emanating from the United
States, the Machakos Protocol in 2002, occurred in spite of a
rift between the White House and the State Department over selfdetermination.

The White House indicated a preference toward

self-determination for the South while Danforth and the State
Department worked to keep the Sudan whole.

The Machakos

Protocol was more a template for future peace talks than a peace
plan.

Calling for a referendum on self-determination for the

South, the Protocol reconfirmed the sectarian nature of the
Sudanese government.116

Since 2002, the U.S. has been preoccupied

with its two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has not
allocated the “necessary diplomatic resources” to the peace
process.117

The lack of U.S. involvement has led to ineffective

peace settlements.

The 2005 peace accord signed by both

Khartoum and the SPLM/A has not managed to end the violence in
the Sudan.

Khartoum’s aspirations for the oil in the South have

created a secondary genocide as the government continues to push
Nuer and Dinka off of the oil rich lands.

Khartoum’s refusal to

accept oil revenue sharing as a part of the peace plan begs the
question; how can peace gain traction if the government
continues to perpetuate genocide?
116
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President Beshir refuses to rule in accordance with the
2005 peace agreement as this would require a relative decrease
in personal power.118

Without willingness on the part of Beshir

and his political party to relinquish some control, it becomes
obvious that a viable peace process requires an increase in
political pressure from the United States and the international
community at large.

But that process begins with an

understanding of the conflict as it is, not as the West wants to
see it.

Perhaps a commitment to this type of understanding will

allow the United States to offer the victims of the Sudanese
Civil War more than mere “tea and sympathy.”
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